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Biased, but expert: Trade-offs in how stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates are perceived and consequences for persuasion☆

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ABSTRACT

Stigmatized versus non-stigmatized people advocating on behalf of the stigmatized group are perceived as more biased, suggesting that they might be less effective advocates. Yet, research testing whether stigmatized or non-stigmatized advocates are more persuasive has yielded mixed results. The current work builds on previous research to clarify that this occurs because stigmatized advocates are also perceived as more expert on social justice issues. Six studies document these trade-offs in perceptions. Three studies demonstrate that stigmatized and non-stigmatized advocates seem not to differ in their effectiveness because while perceived expertise boosts the effectiveness of stigmatized advocates, perceived bias undermines it. This occurs both when people confront societal inequality and interpersonal prejudice. Despite the lack of difference in persuasiveness, people predict that the stigmatized advocate will be *more* effective, suggesting that observers may not recognize perceived bias's role in undermining effectiveness. The present findings differ not only from participants' lay theories, but also from conclusions commonly reached by reviews of the literature which suggest that stigmatized advocates may be *less* effective than their non-stigmatized counterparts. By examining a broader range of perceptions and effects on audience members' attitudes and intentions to behave consistently with advocacy, we provide a more complete view of these effects.

An essential question for social movements is how to effectively inspire attitude change and collective action. Anecdotally, people are often inspired to support a cause in response to a message from an advocate (i.e., someone who communicates their stance on an issue). For example, Emma Watson (a woman) and Benedict Cumberbatch (a man), two British television actors have used their celebrity platforms to advocate for gender equality. One might wonder how the gender of these advocates might influence their persuasiveness. The present research investigates whether advocates' identities—belonging to stigmatized (disadvantaged or devalued in a social context) or non-stigmatized (advantaged) groups—influences relative persuasiveness when advocating for the stigmatized group. We reconsider mixed evidence and the prevailing conclusion that stigmatized advocates are at a persuasive disadvantage.

We approach this question by examining perceptions of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates. Prior work has suggested that when advocates of a message are perceived as unbiased (objective), expert (knowledgeable), and trustworthy (honest), they are often more persuasive (Hovland et al., 1953; Wallace et al., 2020a; for conditions of these effects, see Petty & Wegener, 1998). Therefore, we examine both the perceptions that people form of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates, as well as the implications these perceptions have for their effectiveness. As we review, some areas of the literature on reactions to people with stigmatized versus non-stigmatized identities have developed in isolation of one another. Often these literatures have primarily examined perceptions of advocates, rather than their persuasiveness, and they have each focused on different perceptions of stigmatized advocates – sometimes as biased, sometimes as expert, and sometimes as trustworthy with measures that conflated bias and untrustworthiness. These different foci have yielded different conclusions about who might be most effective. In the current work, we integrate previous findings by concurrently examining effects on perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness. Further, we examine downstream consequences of these perceptions for audience attitudes and collective action intentions to

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directly inform questions about different advocates' relative effectiveness.

1. Evidence that stigmatized advocates are perceived as biased

Research in the advocacy and confronting prejudice domains reliably finds that stigmatized advocates are perceived negatively. That is, when stigmatized people support their own group (e.g., by calling out discrimination), they are viewed as more biased, complaining, and overreacting than non-stigmatized advocates (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Eliezer & Major, 2012; Gardner & Ryan, 2020; Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Trump-Steele, 2019); this effect extends across social categories and a range of advocacy situations. This has included work conducted in the domain of prejudice confrontation, which has included confronting individual prejudice (Czopp et al., 2006), advocating for anti-racist policies (Schultz & Maddox, 2013), teaching about prejudice (Crittle & Maddox, 2017), and attending protests (Marshburn et al., 2021). Consistent with prior work, the current studies investigate a range of situations in which stigmatized versus non-stigmatized group members support the stigmatized group.

These negative perceptions of stigmatized advocates are clearly concerning. Across empirical articles, reviews of the literature, and articles providing advice to public audiences, many have noted that these findings suggest that stigmatized advocates are likely to be less effective than non-stigmatized group members (Crandall et al., 2021; Crittle & Maddox, 2017; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Monteith et al., 2019; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Selvanathan et al., 2020). For example, in reviewing the literature, Drury and Kaiser (2014) noted that "the current findings do suggest that non-target confronters of racism will have advantages over target group members…The findings thus have implications for the strategic use of non-targets." Thus, one read of the literature could elicit conclusions that non-stigmatized advocates are likely to be more effective than stigmatized advocates, particularly if considering past findings on perceived bias.

2. Mixed evidence that stigmatized advocates are less effective

If the goal of research efforts in this area is to understand attempts to change society, it would seem important to measure the effects that stigmatized advocates have on audiences' attitudes and intentions to take action. This is a related, but distinct research question from understanding how people perceive advocates (e.g., as biased). Compared with the previous work on perceived bias, a slightly different picture emerges when more directly considering stigmatized versus non-stigmatized group members' relative effectiveness—as measured in terms of changes in attitudes, intentions, or behaviors—in advocacy contexts. Such studies provide mixed evidence (Monteith et al., 2019).

Some results cohere with the notion that non-stigmatized group members are more effective advocates. For example, some research finds that Black confronters are less effective at reducing future expressions of racism than White confronters (Munger, 2017; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010). Similarly, women are less effective than men at convincing a male audience of the importance of gender equality (Trump-Steele, 2019), and LGBTQ-identifying people receive fewer donations for LGBTQ nonprofits when disclosing their sexual orientation (Harrison & Michelson, 2012). However, other research either does not include a measure of advocacy effectiveness (Eliezer & Major, 2012; Gulker et al., 2013; Schultz & Maddox, 2013) or finds *no effect* of advocate identity on people's beliefs, intentions, or behavior (Blanchard et al., 1994; Broockman & Kalla, 2016; Burke, 2011; Czopp et al., 2006; Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Gardner & Ryan, 2020; Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Wessel et al., 2022).

Yet another set of studies that has been relatively siloed from the advocacy and confrontation literature finds that stigmatized advocates can be more persuasive. For example, queer (vs. straight) women who put rainbow filters on their Facebook profile pictures evoke greater intentions to support LGBTQ people (Matsick et al., 2020). Additionally, Black (vs. White) people more strongly influence judgments of whether an ambiguously racist behavior was discriminatory (Crosby & Monin, 2013). Taken together, although stigmatized advocates are reliably perceived as biased, past work that measured effectiveness finds mixed results for whether these perceptions translated to attitude change or support for social change actions.

3. Perceived experience leading to inferences of bias and expertise

The seemingly inconsistent effects detailed above might stem from the perception that stigmatized (vs. non-stigmatized) individuals have *directly experienced discrimination* (Saguy et al., 2020). Specifically, perceived experience might elicit inferences that the advocate is biased (i.e., motivated to reach a certain conclusion) but also expert (i.e., knowledgeable about the issues). Prior work has suggested that perceived expertise can positively facilitate attitude change (Petty et al., 1981), whereas perceived bias has a negative effect (Wallace et al., 2020a), suggesting that perceived expertise might counter the negative effect perceived bias has on advocacy effectiveness. In sum, membership in a stigmatized group might cue *perceived experience* with that group's social issues (Saguy et al., 2020), which elicits perceptions of being biased but also expert. If this were to occur, stigmatized and non-stigmatized advocates could often be equivalently persuasive due to the countervailing influences of perceived bias reducing persuasion and perceived expertise increasing persuasion.

4. Evidence that stigmatized advocates are perceived as expert

Although not examined in an advocacy or confrontation context, there is some research suggestive of the idea that stigmatized advocates can be viewed as expert on social justice issues. For example, Black (vs. White) people are viewed as more expert on issues of racial discrimination (Crosby & Monin, 2013), and Biracial and Black (vs. White) people are perceived as more expert on diversity ideologies (Gaither et al., 2019). Relatedly, when social justice non-profits have a leadership team comprised of more non-stigmatized rather than stigmatized group members, they are perceived as less aware of inequality (Iyer & Achia, 2021). Notably, this work documenting perceptions of stigmatized people as expert has tended to be siloed from work focused on perceptions of stigmatized advocates as biased.

In a different context, however, recent research has demonstrated trade-offs in how scientists studying prejudice are viewed. Specifically, scientists investigating prejudice who belonged to a stigmatized group were viewed as more expert but also as having a vested interest (Thai et al., 2021). Ultimately, these trade-offs counteract one another, yielding no difference in the perceived legitimacy of research conducted by those with stigmatized versus non-stigmatized identities. Although these trade-offs could extend to an advocacy context, conclusions in the literature that stigmatized advocates are at a persuasive disadvantage might have led researchers to expect that attributions of expertise to stigmatized advocates would *not* extend to the confronting and advocacy domains. Further, the confronting and advocacy contexts differ in important and potentially consequential ways from the scientific context used by Thai et al. (2021).

Scientific contexts – where researchers communicate empirical findings – might make expertise relatively more salient. On the other hand, social justice advocacy contexts – where communicators express opinions – might make vested interest relatively more salient than expertise. The different communication goals in these contexts could influence whether people infer perceived expertise and vested interest in the first place or could influence the relative weight of these perceptions in impacting the advocate's persuasiveness. Further, whereas Thai et al. (2021) document opposing influences on the perceived legitimacy of

research conducted by stigmatized versus non-stigmatized scientists, it remains unknown what downstream effects these attributions might have for whether participants would change their attitudes, apply the findings in their lives, and take collective action based on them. By examining whether these trade-offs extend to an advocacy context and collective action outcomes, we hope to directly inform whether stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates are equally effective in changing attitudes and creating social change.

5. Unpacking perceived vested interest

Prior research has documented that vested interest of an advocate (i.e., when the advocate has something to gain by successfully persuading their audience) results in the advocate seeming untrustworthy, biased, or both (Wallace, 2019; Wallace et al., 2020c). This is part of a recent line of research demonstrating that perceived bias and perceived untrustworthiness are distinct constructs. People think of bias as a motivation to take a particular position, whereas they think of untrustworthiness as intentions to be dishonest (Wallace et al., 2020a). At times, these constructs have similar antecedents and consequences, but not always. For example, although perceived bias and perceived untrustworthiness can each undermine persuasion (Wallace et al., 2020a), when advocates switch from advocating for one position on a topic to the opposite (e.g. from opposing to supporting a policy), perceived bias, but not untrustworthiness, can indirectly increase persuasion because it is surprising for biased advocates to switch positions (Wallace et al., 2020b).

People also use different factors to infer bias versus untrustworthiness. For example, providing highly compelling arguments (Wallace et al., 2021), presenting a non-refutational two-sided message (Wallace et al., 2023), or expressing doubt (Luttrell & Wallace, 2023) can each reduce perceived bias but have no effect on or sometimes increase perceived untrustworthiness. Because of these differing antecedents and consequences, understanding the specific perceptions of stigmatized advocates could inform efforts to combat any negative perceptions. Thus, novel to the present work, we examine effects of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates on both perceived bias and untrustworthiness, separately.

6. Goals of the current work

The current research seeks to identify potential reasons why previous studies have obtained mixed results regarding the effectiveness of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates. One key difference between stigmatized and non-stigmatized advocates is that the stigmatized advocate is *viewed as more experienced* with discrimination and other issues affecting their group's disadvantaged status (Saguy et al., 2020). When people seem to have experience with an issue, that experience might lead to perceptions that they are expert. However, such experiences might also be seen as leading to slanted information exposure or personal investment in the issue. Thus, people might view experience as a signal that someone is both biased and expert. We test whether the perceived experience attributed to stigmatized advocates leads others to perceive them as biased but expert on social justice issues related to their group (Fig. 1). The consequence of these dual perceptions might be an overall null effect of the (non)stigmatized advocate on audience attitudes and collective action intentions, as perceived bias would decrease, but perceived expertise would increase their effectiveness.

If the proposed dual effects of an advocate's stigmatized identity on bias and expertise stem from perceived experience, similar effects should occur in other domains in which advocates are viewed as differing in perceived experience. Therefore, we included scenarios with high and low experience advocates across multiple domains unrelated to stigma or social justice as additional tests of whether perceived experience can account for differences in perceived bias and expertise. Notably, these other contexts using high versus low experience advocates differ in many ways compared to the social justice scenarios. Whereas the perception that the stigmatized advocates have more experience with discrimination stems from a cultural understanding of marginalization and group hierarchy, the differences in perceived experience in these other domains is primarily due to their occupations. Certainly, this is not to suggest that the lived experience stigmatized advocates have with discrimination is equivalent to or interchangeable with the other "high experience" advocates under investigation; in contrast, the incomparability of these different forms of perceived high experience is essential for the present research. Including these additional domains provides a test against alternative explanations that would be confounded if we only examined stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates (e.g., whether differences are driven by social status rather than perceived experience). As such, we predict that being perceived as experienced on a topic should elicit perceptions of greater expertise and greater bias, across domains.

7. Overview of studies

To validate the manipulation of advocate experience, the first study (Pilot Study) aimed to conceptually replicate previous research (Saguy et al., 2020) showing that stigmatized advocates are perceived as more experienced on social justice issues. Additionally, it aimed to develop manipulations of source experience outside the social justice domain, which would allow us to test the generalizability of effects in future studies. Next, we examined whether perceived advocate experience increases perceived bias and expertise. In these studies (Studies 1a, 1b, and 2), we included multiple topics and social groups to test for generalizability. We also examined whether these effects generalize across some different advocacy situations: 1) whether advocates take a stance versus simply provide information and 2) whether advocates highlight a



Fig. 1. Proposed model in which stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates should be perceived as more experienced with social justice issues, which should make them seem biased and expert, which should have opposing influences on audience attitudes and collective action intentions.

problem or a solution. In Studies 3a and 3b, we examined downstream consequences of these perceptions on people's anticipation of the advocate's effectiveness as well as attitudes and intentions to take action in support of the advocated cause. Finally, in Study 4, we examined whether these processes extend to interpersonal prejudice confrontation contexts.

8. A note on terminology

Because this research was motivated by our interest in the effects of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates and our observation that there seemed to be a puzzle in the confronting/advocacy literatures, we have focused on stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates in the introduction. Because we believe that perceived experience drives the effects of advocate stigmatization, and we examine a broader range of advocates who differ in perceived experience, throughout the studies, we will use "perceived experience" to label our independent variable. We return to discussing the implications for stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates in the discussion section of each study and the General Discussion.

9. Sample size determination across studies and openness and transparency in research decisions

Sample size was determined before any data analysis. Across studies, sample size was determined through a combination of rules-of-thumb (at least 40 people per study for exclusively within-subjects studies, and at least 50 people per cell for studies with between-subjects factors; Green, 2010; Wilson Van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007), availability of resources, and sensitivity to the proposed design. Because the pilot study and Studies 1–2 employed more powerful within-subjects designs, we recruited smaller sample sizes than the between-subjects designs in Studies 3–4. Sensitivity analyses for each sample size are available in the respective methods sections. Our *a priori* exclusion criterion for all studies was to exclude participants who reported a 1 when asked how seriously they took the study on a continuous scale (1 – *not at all seriously*, 5 – *very seriously*). Importantly, the data presented in this manuscript comprises all the data we collected to test these hypotheses, so the observed results do not reflect selective reporting or biased estimates of effect sizes. These studies were not pre-registered, but they built directly on one another such that hypotheses and analyses for later studies paralleled those for the earlier studies. All studies were approved by the Ohio State University Institutional Review Board. We report all manipulations, measures, and exclusions. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables of interest for each study are available in the Online Supplement. All data, analysis code, and research materials are available at https://osf.io/yn47d/?view_only=6336677a6f294d79a9eeb540ec683cac. Demographic characteristics for participants in all studies are available in Table 1.

10. Pilot study

In the initial pilot study, we sought to establish that the planned experimental manipulations do differentially affect perceived experience, conceptually replicating previous work demonstrating that people from historically excluded groups are perceived as more likely to have experienced discrimination (Saguy et al., 2020). We extend this from simply examining perceived experience with discrimination to perceived experience with a particular issue and in the case of the stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates, a social justice issue relevant to their identity. Consistent with the goal to assess consequences of perceived experience broadly, we tested manipulations of perceived experience using advocates who differed in perceived experience in domains unrelated to social justice as well.

10.1. Method

10.1.1. Design and procedure

Forty-seven participants were recruited from the Ohio State University Psychology Research Pool. Two participants were excluded based on *a priori* exclusion criteria (see Table 1). A sensitivity analysis conducted in G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) suggested that $N = 45$ with two repeated measures would have 80% power across an infinite number of samples to detect an effect size of $d = 0.43$ at $\alpha = .05$. After consenting, participants encountered advocacies on thirteen topics. Participants rated two different advocates for each topic: one expected to be perceived as more experienced and one as less experienced. Thus, this study employed a 13 (topics) x 2 (perceived advocate type: experienced versus inexperienced) within-subjects design. As an example, one of the scenarios was, "Imagine that a [woman/man] provided a message in support of [her/his] organization's current policy to prevent sexual harassment." The complete list of topics, the advocates perceived as more versus less experienced, and the later studies in which the topics were used are all reported in Table 2. For each scenario, participants rated the perceived experience of the advocate on two items ($r = .93$; e.g., "To what extent do you think that this person has personal experience relevant to this issue? 1 – *not at all*, 7 – *very much*").

Participants rated either all the inexperienced advocates and then all the experienced advocates or vice versa, and whether they rated the experienced or inexperienced advocates first was counterbalanced. Further, the topics were grouped into three sets. These sets of topics roughly mirrored the sets employed in the later studies. Each included a mix of topics related to gender, race, sexuality, socioeconomic status, and/or industry identities. For example, one set included banning the confederate flag, the gender wage gap, a bike shop, and LGBTQ workplace discrimination. The order of these topic sets and of the topics within each set were counterbalanced across participants; within each participant, there was a consistent order of topics/sets for their ratings of both the inexperienced and experienced advocates. At the end of the study, participants were thanked and debriefed.

10.2. Results

10.2.1. Effects of advocate experience manipulation on perceived advocate experience

Because the primary purpose of this study was to ensure that the advocate experience manipulation would create differences in perceived advocate experience for each topic, we conducted a series of paired samples *t*-tests comparing perceived experience of the advocate pairs for each topic. Every topic demonstrated the predicted pattern, and the condition differences were significant for all topics except for the bike store, which was marginal (see Table 3).

10.3. Discussion

This pilot study demonstrated that our manipulations of perceived experience in fact created differences in perceived experience. This included people from stigmatized versus non-stigmatized groups being perceived as more experienced with social issues affecting the stigmatized group, conceptually replicating and extending previous work (Saguy et al., 2020). The current study also identified domains and advocates that differed in perceived experience outside the realm of social justice, thus enabling us to examine effects of advocate experience separately from a social justice context as well.

11. Studies 1a and 1b

Studies 1a and 1b provide a within-subjects test of the hypothesis that an advocate perceived as more experienced on a topic would be viewed as biased but expert. Participants were asked about a number of topics to allow for the examination of effects of many different

Table 1
Demographic characteristics of participants for all studies.

	Pilot	Study 1a	Study 1b	Study 2	Study 3a	Study 3b	Study 4
Gender							
%Male	44.4	28.6	40.3	41.8	48.7	42.6	36.8
% Female	55.6	70	59.7	58.2	51.3	56.9	61.9
% Non-binary	0	1.4	0	0	0	0.5	1.2
Race							
%White	66.6	68.6	–	71.4	68.3	73.2	68.4
%Black	8.9	4.3	–	11.2	11.2	8.3	10.5
%Hispanic/Latinx	2.2	2.9	–	2	4	7.4	3.6
%Asian/Pacific Islander	24.4	10	–	16.3	18.3	15.7	22.7
%Arab/Middle Eastern	4.4	0	–	0	2.2	1.9	1.2
%Mixed	0	10	–	1	0.4	0.5	0
%Native American	0	1.4	–	1	1	0.9	0.4
%Other	0	2.9	–	0	0.4	0.5	0
Age (*M*, *SD*)	19.84, 2.96	19.30, 1.86	18.78, 1.58	19.47, 3.15	19.49, 2.83	19.28, 2.49	18.96, 1.52
Number of exclusions	2	0	0	1	5	13	0

Note. Race and the attention check were not assessed in Study 1b due to experimenter oversight.

Table 2
Topics and experienced versus inexperienced advocates used in this series of studies and the studies in which they were employed.

Topic	Experienced	Inexperienced	Study
Less restrictive immigration policy	Latinx Person	White American	1a
Reduced regulations on the oil industry	Former Oil Company Executive	Environmentalist	1a
Organization's current maternity leave policy, which allows for a year of paid time off	Woman	Man	1a, 1b
Organization's current policy to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace	Woman	Man	1a, 1b, 2
A current policy designed to reduce poverty	Poor Person	Rich Person	1a, 1b, 2, S1
Nuclear power industry	Nuclear Power Executive	Environmentalist	1b
Ruling for same sex marriage	LGBTQ-Identifying Person	Heterosexual Person	1b
Products sold at Bikey Bikes	Owner of the bike shop	Visitor of the bike shop	1b
Over-taxing corporations	CEO	janitor	2
Workplace discrimination against LGBTQ-identifying people	LGBTQ-Identifying Person	Heterosexual Person	2, S1
Gender wage gap	Woman	Man	2, S1
Banning the Confederate flag from displays in public buildings	Black American	White American	S1
Instituting gender quotas that require companies to include a minimum number of women in leadership positions	Woman	Man	3a, 3b, 4

Note. For all topics except over-taxing corporations, the gender wage gap, and discrimination against LGBTQ-identifying people, the advocate took a stance "in support of" the topic. For the remaining three topics, the advocate provided "a solution to".

experienced versus inexperienced advocates in a single study. We were particularly interested in cases in which an advocate takes a stance, rather than simply providing information about a topic.[1]

11.1. Method

11.1.1. Design and procedure

Seventy participants in Study 1a and sixty-seven participants in Study 1b were recruited from the Ohio State University Psychology Research Pool. After informed consent, participants encountered advocates on five topics in Study 1a and six topics in Study 1b (see Table 2 for topics). Sensitivity analyses using PANGEA (Westfall, 2016) suggested that $N = 70$ with 5 topics and $N = 67$ with 6 topics would provide 80% power across an infinite number of samples to detect small effects ($r =$ .10 and $r = .15$, respectively). Participants rated two different advocates for each topic: one likely to be perceived as more experienced and one as less experienced. As an example, participants read, "Imagine that a [LGBTQ-identifying person/heterosexual person] provided a message in support of the ruling for same sex marriage." Participants rated each advocate on how much they seemed *biased, dishonest,* and *inexpert* (1) to *unbiased, honest,* and *expert* (9). Bias items were recoded prior to analyses so that higher numbers would indicate more perceived bias.[2] The study was blocked such that participants rated all the high (or low) experience advocates for each topic and then rated the low (or high) experience advocates. The order of presentation for all within-subjects conditions as well as the advocate perception measures were counterbalanced between participants, but each participant saw the topics and measures in the same order for both the experienced and inexperienced advocate conditions. Participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed.

[1] Originally, we thought that advocate experience might be less likely to lead to perceived bias and expertise when the advocate simply provides information, as this could make the vested interest implications of having experience less salient. Therefore, we had also included a within-subjects manipulation of whether the advocate was advocating or simply providing information. In Study 1a, we observed significant moderation of effects by message type, but the condition differences between information and advocacy included other differences, such as content of the information/advocacy. In Study 1b, we employed a cleaner manipulation of frame controlling for such differences and largely observed a lack of moderation. For details about these conditions, please see the Online Supplement.

[2] Although we hypothesized that the experienced advocate would be perceived as more biased, we did not necessarily expect them to be perceived as less trustworthy (i.e., dishonest). Petty, Fleming, Priester, and Feinstein (2001) found a null effect on perceived trustworthiness when advocates took a position for versus against their group's interest. If we found a similar divergence in patterns, it would add to literature highlighting the independence of perceived bias and untrustworthiness (Wallace et al., 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2021).

Table 3
Effects of the advocate experience manipulation on perceived experience by topic.

Topic	Experienced *M (SD)*	Inexperienced *M (SD)*	*t*	*df*	*p*	*d*	*d* 95% CI
immigration	5.42 (1.13)	3.18 (1.52)	7.32	44	< .001	1.09	[0.72, 1.46]
oil industry	5.90 (0.98)	5.06 (1.35)	3.69	44	<.001	0.55	[0.23, 0.86]
maternity leave	5.74 (0.95)	3.33 (1.56)	8.64	44	< .001	1.29	[0.89, 1.68]
sexual harassment	5.56 (1.09)	4.28 (1.29)	4.65	44	< .001	0.69	[0.37, 1.02]
poverty	6.30 (1.01)	2.93 (1.28)	12.61	44	< .001	1.88	[1.39, 2.36]
nuclear power	5.81 (1.31)	4.97 (1.38)	3.79	44	< .001	0.57	[0.25, 0.88]
same sex marriage	6.03 (1.27)	3.57 (1.26)	7.81	44	< .001	1.16	[0.78, 1.54]
bike shop	5.90 (1.26)	5.46 (1.39)	1.75	44	.086	0.26	[−0.04, 0.56]
over-taxing corporations	5.63 (1.10)	3.10 (1.36)	9.06	44	< .001	1.35	[0.94, 1.75]
LGBTQ discrimination	6.14 (1.06)	3.61 (1.63)	8.12	44	< .001	1.21	[0.82, 1.59]
gender wage gap	5.84 (1.07)	3.26 (1.53)	8.72	44	< .001	1.30	[0.90, 1.69]
Confederate flag	5.78 (1.07)	3.90 (1.38)	7.56	44	< .001	1.13	[0.75, 1.50]
gender quotas	5.54 (1.03)	3.44 (1.48)	7.32	44	< .001	1.09	[0.72, 1.46]

Note. Because each of these are simply testing the effect of advocate experience within each topic, the numerator degrees of freedom is one. Ratings were on a 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much* scale.

11.2. Results

11.2.1. Analysis strategy

In the Pilot Study, we presented analyses for each topic separately because the primary goal was to ensure that the individual manipulations were effective. Throughout the rest of the paper, wherein the primary goal is to examine effects of perceived advocate experience in general, we present hierarchical linear models for studies employing within-subjects designs as a means of efficiently presenting results across topics.[3] Results for individual topics are graphed in gray in the in-text figures, presented in the Online Supplement, and are consistent with the results presented across topics. We examined results across all topics using hierarchical linear modeling in which participants (at level 1) were modeled within topics (at level 2), and both intercepts and the slope of advocate experience were allowed to randomly vary.

11.2.2. Effects of perceived experience on advocate perceptions

We first examined the effect of advocate experience on perceived bias, trustworthiness, and expertise (Fig. 2). Consistent with our hypothesis, the experienced advocate was viewed as more biased, Study 1a: $\gamma = 1.14$, 95% CI [0.78, 1.50], $t(694) = 6.22$, $p < .001$, $r = .23$; Study 1b: $\gamma = 1.14$, 95% CI [0.86, 1.42], $t(797) = 8.01$, $p < .001$, $r = .27$, but also more expert, Study 1a: $\gamma = 0.73$, 95% CI [0.49, 0.98], $t(694) = 5.90$, $p < .001$, $r = .22$; Study 1b: $\gamma = 0.93$, 95% CI [0.61, 1.24], $t(797) = 5.78$, $p < .001$, $r = .20$, than the inexperienced advocate, highlighting the trade-offs associated with each type of advocate. There was no effect of advocate experience on trustworthiness, Study 1a: $\gamma = -0.04$, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.10], $t(694) = -0.56$, $p = .578$, $r = -.02$; Study 1b: $\gamma = 0.05$, 95% CI [−0.25, 0.35], $t(797) = 0.34$, $p = .736$, $r = .01$.[4] The effect of perceived experience was moderated by topic for perceived bias, Study 1a: $F(4, 66) = 7.05$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$, 90% CI [.12, .40]; Study 1b: $F(5, 62) = 3.69$, $p = .005$, $\eta_p^2 = .23$, 90% CI [.04, .32], trustworthiness, Study 1a: $F(4, 66) = 3.52$, $p = .011$, $\eta_p^2 = .18$, 90% CI [.02, .27]; Study 1b: $F(5, 62) = 6.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .33$, 90% CI [.13, .42], and expertise, Study 1a: $F(4, 66) = 4.95$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .23$, 90% CI [.06, .33]; Study 1b: $F(5, 62) = 7.55$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .38$, 90% CI [.18, .47]. These interactions largely reflected that the magnitude of the effect of perceived experience varied, despite being significant and in the same direction across topics.

11.3. Discussion

Studies 1a and 1b provided initial evidence that perceived advocate experience comes with trade-offs: experienced advocates are viewed as more expert but also more biased; this included stigmatized advocates who were assumed to have high levels of experience with issues affecting their group. This replicates previous work suggesting that when stigmatized group members (high perceived experience) advocate on behalf of their group, they are viewed as more biased (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Eliezer & Major, 2012; Gardner & Ryan, 2020; Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Trump-Steele, 2019). Additionally, this is the first work in an advocacy context to document that stigmatized advocates are viewed as more expert, extending previous work in other contexts suggesting that stigmatized group members can be perceived as more knowledgeable on social justice issues (Crosby & Monin, 2013; Iyer & Achia, 2021; cf. Thai et al., 2021). There was no effect on perceived untrustworthiness, contributing to recent work highlighting the separability of perceived bias and untrustworthiness (Wallace et al., 2020a) and suggesting that the differences in perceived vested interest observed in Thai et al. (2021) likely reflected perceived bias rather than perceived untrustworthiness.

12. Study 2

In Study 2, we sought to replicate Study 1 and examine whether the effects extend to different types of advocacy. Specifically, advocates could focus on problems or potential solutions to those problems. Experienced advocates might seem more expert about problems but not necessarily solutions. This could occur because knowledge of problems is easily acquirable by experience, but knowledge of solutions might be less so. For example, experiencing sexual harassment could directly provide the target with knowledge that it is a problem, but might not provide information about how to solve it. We sought to test whether perceived experience has similar or different effects on expertise for messages about problems rather than solutions.

12.1. Method

12.1.1. Design and procedure

Ninety-eight participants were recruited from the Ohio State University Psychology Research Pool. One participant was excluded based on *a priori* exclusion criteria (see Table 1). The design of Study 2 was

[3] Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) allows researchers to assess relationships when data is nested. Because participants responded to multiple topics and multiple advocates for each topic, participants are nested within topic. When examining nested data, there is sampling error associated with people (like with non-nested studies), but there is also sampling error associated with the other level(s) – in this case the topic. Additionally, the effect of advocate experience may vary across topics. HLM accounts for all of this, making it the most appropriate analysis choice, given our data and goals (Nezlek, 2011).

[4] The model predicting trustworthiness would not converge in Study 1a when the slope of perceived experience was modeled as randomly varying so in this model, only the intercept was specified as random.



Fig. 2. Effects of perceived advocate experience on perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness in Studies 1a (panel a) and 1b (panel b) across all topics.

very similar to Studies 1a and 1b, with a few exceptions. First, we manipulated whether the advocate described a problem or a solution to a problem within-subjects (stance frame: problem vs. solution). Second, some of the topics were replaced with others (see Table 2). As an example, participants saw, "Imagine that a [LGBTQ-identifying/heterosexual] person provided a message describing [the negative consequences of/a solution to] workplace discrimination against LGBTQ-identifying people." A sensitivity analysis using PANGEA (Westfall, 2016) suggested that $N = 97$ with 5 topics, the advocate experience within subjects factor, and the stance frame within subjects factor would provide 80% power across an infinite number of samples to detect a small effect ($r = .06$).

12.2. Results

12.2.1. Effects of perceived experience on advocate perceptions

We once again examined results across all topics using hierarchical linear modeling in which participants (at level 1) were modeled within topics (at level 2) and both slopes and intercepts were allowed to randomly vary (Fig. 3, Table 4). We examined the effect of advocate experience, stance frame, and their interaction on perceived bias, trustworthiness, and expertise.[5] Replicating the previous studies, the experienced advocate was viewed as more biased, $\gamma = 0.62$, 95% CI [0.52, 0.72], $t(1932) = 12.43$, $p < .001$, $r = .27$, but also more expert, $\gamma = 1.10$, 95% CI [1.01, 1.20], $t(1931) = 23.75$, $p < .001$, $r = .48$, than the inexperienced advocate. In this study the experienced advocate was also viewed as significantly more trustworthy, $\gamma = 0.33$, 95% CI [0.25, 0.42], $t(1932) = 7.76$, $p < .001$, $r = .17$.

Stance frame did not significantly moderate experience effects on perceived bias or perceived trustworthiness (Table 4). However, stance frame did significantly moderate experience effects on perceived advocate expertise. This interaction reflected that there was a larger effect of advocate experience when the advocate described a problem, $\gamma = 1.26$, 95% CI [1.13, 1.39], $t(1931) = 19.11$, $p < .001$, $r = .40$, rather than a solution, $\gamma = 0.95$, 95% CI [0.82, 1.08], $t(1931) = 14.47$, $p < .001$, $r = .31$. Because there were moderate-sized effects within each condition (problem vs. solution), this suggests that the effect of perceived experience on expertise extends across each frame and is simply a bit stronger with a problem-focused message.

12.3. Discussion

Study 2 replicated that perceived experience leads advocates to be perceived as biased but expert. Furthermore, Study 2 identified that advocate experience had a stronger effect on perceived expertise if the stance was framed as a problem. However, reliable and medium-sized effects on advocate expertise were observed across both problem- and solution-focused stances, suggesting relevance across these contexts. Stance frame did not moderate the effects of experience on perceived bias and trustworthiness, highlighting generalizability. Finally, there was a small effect of advocate experience on perceived trustworthiness in this study, unlike in the previous set of studies. However, this effect on perceived trustworthiness was in the opposite direction of perceived objectivity (lack of bias), again highlighting the conceptual independence of perceived bias and untrustworthiness, and suggesting that the vested interest effects observed in prior work (Thai et al., 2021) likely reflected perceived bias more than perceived untrustworthiness. Interested readers might also wonder whether particular advocates are simply viewed as biased and expert across all topics. Study S1, reported in the Online Supplement finds that the bias-expertise trade-off is specific to topics related to the advocate's perceived experience.

13. Studies 3a and 3b

In the previous studies, participants imagined an advocacy experience but did not encounter an advocate's persuasive message. This approach allowed us to efficiently test hypotheses across different advocate identities and topics as well as avoid effects of message

[5] The model would not converge when the slope of advocate experience was allowed to randomly vary when predicting perceived bias and expertise, so only a random intercept was included in those models.



Fig. 3. Effects of perceived advocate experience on perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness in Study 2 for solution and problem framed stances.

Table 4
Effects of perceived advocate experience, stance frame, and their interaction on perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness in Study 2.

	Perceived bias					Perceived expertise					Perceived trustworthiness				
	γ	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	γ	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	γ	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*
Experience	0.62	[0.52, 0.72]	12.43	< .001	.27	1.10	[1.01, 1.20]	23.75	< .001	.48	0.33	[0.25, 0.42]	7.76	< .001	.17
Stance Frame	−0.11	[−0.21, −0.01]	−2.22	.027	−.05	0.01	[−0.08, 0.10]	0.24	.811	.01	0.03	[−0.05, 0.12]	0.74	.458	.02
Interaction	0.04	[−0.05, 0.14]	0.88	.381	.02	−0.15	[−0.24, −0.06]	−3.28	.001	−.07	−0.01	[−0.10, 0.07]	−0.34	.737	−.01

Note. Degrees of freedom in the bias and trustworthiness models = 1932, in the expertise model = 1931 (due to a missing data point). γ refers to level 1 fixed effect coefficients in the HLM and the 95% CI is around that coefficient.

content. Further, the previous studies mirror times when people simply learn that a person of one identity has taken a particular stance without hearing the specifics. In Studies 3a and 3b, however, we shifted the paradigm to instead provide participants with an ostensibly real message from a real advocate.

Studies 3a and 3b also tested downstream consequences of perceived bias and expertise. First, we examined effectiveness in persuading audiences (attitudes) and inspiring support for collective action (intentions). Based on prior work (Wallace et al., 2020a, 2021), we hypothesized that perceived bias might undermine, whereas expertise would boost, attitude change and collective action intentions. Because advocate experience increases both perceived bias and expertise, this would mean that advocate experience has opposing influences on attitudes and collective action intentions.

Additionally, social movements are often faced with the choice of who should advocate. Therefore, we were also interested in which advocate participants anticipated to be more effective. People often do not have introspective access to the factors influencing their attitudes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson et al., 1989). Therefore, audience members could be disposed toward one type of advocate even if that advocate was not actually more persuasive.

13.1. Method

13.1.1. Design and procedure

Two-hundred and twenty-nine participants in Study 3a and two hundred and twenty-eight participants in Study 3b were recruited from the Ohio State University Psychology Research Pool. Five participants in Study 3a and 13 participants in Study 3b were excluded based on *a priori* exclusion criteria or failing to provide data for the dependent variables (see Table 1). Participants encountered a single advocate on a single topic and advocate experience was manipulated between-subjects in a two-cell design. A sensitivity analysis conducted in G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) suggested that $N = 108$ per condition ($N = 216$ total) would result in 80% power across an infinite number of samples to detect an effect of $r = .19$.

After consenting, participants reported their attitudes on a number of topics including gender quotas that would require companies to include a minimum number of women in leadership positions. They then encountered a social media post from Stephen or Stephanie, depending on random assignment to the advocate experience condition. The post read, “Recently, California passed a law mandating that publicly traded corporations in California meet a quota for women on their boards of



Fig. 4. Effects of perceived advocate experience on perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness in Studies 3a (panel a) and 3b (panel b).
Note. Error bars indicate standard errors.

directors. We should expand this policy to the rest of the United States. This is one clear way to push toward gender equality!" Participants reported their perceptions of the advocate, their anticipation that the advocate would be effective, and participant's own attitudes toward the policy and collective action intentions.

13.1.2. Measures

13.1.2.1. Pre-message attitudes. Participants reported their attitudes prior to receiving the message on a single item, "How much would you support instituting gender quotas that require companies to include a minimum number of women in leadership positions?" (1 – *not at all*, 7 – *very much*).

13.1.2.2. Advocate perceptions. ***Perceived Bias.*** Perceived bias was measured with two items, including "To what extent do you feel that [Stephanie/Stephen]'s opinion of gender quotas is a product of bias?". These items were anchored with 1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*, were highly correlated (Study 3a: $r = .73$; Study 3b: $r = .87$), and were averaged to create an index.

Perceived Trustworthiness. Perceived trustworthiness was measured on two items such as, "To what extent does it seem like [Stephanie/Stephen] is honest?". These items were anchored with 1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*, were highly related (Study 3a: $r = .61$; Study 3b: $r = .64$), and were averaged to form an index.

Perceived Expertise. Perceived expertise was measured with two items such as, "How qualified did you think that [Stephanie/Stephen] was to speak about gender quotas?". These items were also anchored with 1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*, highly related (Study 3a: $r = .57$; Study 3b: $r = .66$), and averaged to form an index.

13.1.2.3. Outcomes. ***Attitudes.*** Post-message attitudes toward the quota policy were measured with three items, including "To what extent do you support implementing quotas for women in leadership positions?" Items were anchored with 1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*. These items were averaged to create an index ($\alpha = .95$ in Study 3a, $\alpha = .97$ in Study 3b).

Collective Action Intentions. In Study 3a, participants reported their intentions to engage in three collective action behaviors by responding to the following: "How likely would you be to [attend a protest, post on social media, sign a petition] supporting implementing quotas for women in leadership positions?" Each item was measured on a seven-point scale, anchored with 1 – *not at all likely* to 7 – *very likely* ($\alpha = .88$). In Study 3b, we included multiple items for each collective action behavior to reduce concerns about measurement error, and we added three additional collective action intentions (voting for a candidate, wearing merchandise, calling representatives). We averaged all items in a single index ($\alpha = .97$).

Anticipated Advocate Effectiveness. Anticipated effectiveness was measured with three items in Study 3a and six items in Study 3b (e.g., "To what extent would [Stephanie/Stephen] be an effective advocate for implementing gender quotas?"). All items were measured on seven-point scales anchored with 1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*. These items were averaged to create an index (Study 3a: $\alpha = .82$, Study 3b: $\alpha = .93$).

13.2. Results

Because these studies employed a simple two cell design with no nested data, we used OLS regression. The advocate experience factor was effects coded (woman = 1, man = −1).

13.2.1. Effects of experience on advocate perceptions

Paralleling previous studies, the high experience advocate (woman) was viewed as having greater bias, Study 3a: $b = 0.46$, 95% CI [0.29, 0.63], $t(222) = 5.39$, $p < .001$, $r = .34$; Study 3b: $b = 0.51$, 95% CI [0.32, 0.70], $t(213) = 5.22$, $p < .001$, $r = .34$, and expertise, Study 3a: $b = 0.21$, 95% CI [0.07, 0.36], $t(222) = 2.85$, $p = .005$, $r = .19$; Study 3b: $b = 0.22$, 95% CI [0.06, 0.39], $t(213) = 2.66$, $p = .008$, $r = .18$, than the low experience advocate (man), but there was no effect on perceived trustworthiness, Study 3a: $b = 0.11$, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.24], $t(222) = 1.74$, $p = .083$, $r = .12$; Study 3b: $b = 0.09$, 95% CI [−0.07, 0.24], $t(213) = 1.09$, $p = .279$, $r = .07$ (see Fig. 4) .

13.2.2. Effects of advocate experience on attitudes, collective action intentions, and anticipated advocate effectiveness: mediation through advocate perceptions

We tested parallel mediation models using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) in which perceived bias, trustworthiness, and expertise mediated the effects of advocate experience on (a) attitudes, (b) collective action intentions, and (c) anticipated advocate effectiveness (Tables 5a & 5b; *integrated analyses across Studies 3a, 3b, and 4 in* Fig. 5). Although mediation tests have limitations (Fiedler et al., 2018), the results of the mediation analyses were consistent with our conceptual model. Similar to prior work, advocate experience affected advocate perceptions and advocate perceptions were related to persuasion, but advocate experience did not have overall effects on attitudes or collective action intentions. We present complete model results in Tables 5a and 5b but note key statistics in the text.

Table 5a
Effects of perceived experience, bias, expertise, and trustworthiness on attitudes, collective action intentions, and anticipated advocate effectiveness in Study 3a (the b-, c-, and c'-paths of the mediation model).

	attitudes					collective action intentions					anticipated advocate effectiveness				
	b	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*
Experience total effect	−0.01	[−0.13, 0.12]	−0.09	.927	−.01	−0.15	[−0.36, 0.07]	−1.33	.185	−-.09	0.21	[0.06, 0.37]	2.66	.008	.18
Experience direct effect	0.00	[−0.13, 0.14]	0.04	.970	.00	−0.16	[−0.37, 0.05]	−1.48	.140	−.10	0.10	[−0.05, 0.25]	1.32	.190	.09
Bias	−0.12	[−0.21, −0.02]	−2.38	.018	−.16	−0.25	[−0.40, −0.09]	−3.16	.002	−.21	−0.02	[−0.13, 0.09]	−0.34	.736	−.02
Expertise	0.13	[0.02, 0.25]	2.25	.025	.15	0.50	[0.32, 0.68]	5.47	< .001	.35	0.47	[0.35, 0.60]	7.31	< .001	.44
Trustworthiness	0.12	[−0.01, 0.26]	1.77	.078	.12	0.18	[−0.04, 0.39]	1.64	.102	.11	0.17	[0.02, 0.32]	2.23	.027	.15
Pre-message attitudes	0.67	[0.59, 0.75]	16.59	< .001	.75	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Note. Degrees of freedom for these analyses are 219 (total effect model) and 216 (b path model) for the attitude analyses, 222 (total effect model) and 219 (b path model) for the collective action analyses, and 221 (total effect model) and 218 (b path model) for the anticipated effectiveness analyses (differing because of some missing data and controlling for the pre-message attitudes in the attitude analyses).

Table 5b
Effects of perceived experience, bias, expertise, and trustworthiness on attitudes, collective action intentions, and anticipated advocate effectiveness (the b-, c-, and c'-paths of the mediation model).

	attitudes					collective action intentions					anticipated advocate effectiveness				
	b	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*
Experience total effect	−0.10	[−0.25, 0.05]	−1.35	.178	−.09	−0.04	[−0.26, 0.18]	−0.33	.743	−.02	0.19	[0.02, 0.36]	2.18	.030	.15
Experience direct effect	−0.09	[−0.24, 0.06]	−1.21	.229	−.08	−0.06	[−0.25, 0.13]	−0.61	.542	−.04	0.03	[−0.12, 0.17]	0.37	.715	.03
Bias	−0.12	[−0.22, −0.02]	−2.46	.015	.17	−0.23	[−0.35, −0.10]	−3.54	< .001	−.24	0.01	[−0.09, 0.10]	0.18	.854	.01
Expertise	0.23	[0.10, 0.36]	3.56	< .001	.24	0.47	[0.30, 0.63]	5.63	< .001	.36	0.58	[0.45, 0.70]	9.25	< .001	.54
Trustworthiness	0.24	[0.10, 0.38]	3.44	< .001	.23	0.41	[0.23, 0.59]	4.60	< .001	.30	0.20	[0.07, 0.33]	3.08	.002	.21
Pre-message attitudes	0.54	[0.45, 0.62]	12.26	< .001	.65	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Note. Degrees of freedom for these analyses are 212 (total effect model) and 209 (b path model) for the attitude analyses (because they control for pre-message attitudes), 213 (total effect model) and 210 (b path model) for the collective action analyses, and 212 (total effect model) and 209 (b path model) for the anticipated effectiveness analyses (because of a missing data point).



Fig. 5. Mediation of the stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocate on attitudes, collective action intentions, and anticipated advocate effectiveness through perceived bias and expertise, integrative data analysis across Studies 3a, 3b, and 4.

13.2.2.1. Attitudes. In models that adjusted for pre-message attitudes, there were neither total nor direct effects of perceived experience on post-message attitudes (Tables 5a and 5b).[6] There was, however, a positive association between attitudes and perceived expertise, Study 3a: $b = 0.13$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.25], $t(216) = 2.25$, $p = .025$, $r = .15$; Study 3b: $b = 0.23$, 95% CI [0.10, 0.36], $t(209) = 3.56$, $p < .001$, $r = .24$, and a negative association between attitudes and perceived bias, Study 3a: $b = -0.12$, 95% CI [−0.21, −0.02], $t(216) = -2.38$, $p = .018$, $r = -.16$; Study 3b: $b = -0.12$, 95% CI [−0.22, −0.02], $t(209) = -2.46$, $p = .015$, $r = .17$. This pattern resulted in positive indirect effects of advocate experience through perceived expertise, Study 3a: 0.03, 95% CI [0.003, 0.081]; Study 3b: 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.11], but negative indirect effects through perceived bias, Study 3a: −0.05, 95% CI [−0.11, −0.01]; Study 3b: −0.07, 95% CI [−0.14, −0.02]. There was never an indirect effect through perceived trustworthiness on any outcome in any study (see Online Supplement). In sum, there was not an overall (total) effect of advocate experience on attitudes. Instead, advocate experience increased perceived bias, which undermined attitude change, but advocate experience also increased perceived expertise, which boosted attitude change. This resulted in opposing effects of advocate experience on persuasion through perceived bias and expertise.

13.2.2.2. Collective Action Intentions. Consistent with the mixed results in the existing literature, there were also not significant total or direct effects of the advocate experience manipulation on participants' intentions to take action (Tables 5a and 5b). Collective action intentions were positively associated with expertise, Study 3a: $b = 0.50$, 95% CI [0.32, 0.68], $t(219) = 5.47$, $p < .001$, $r = .35$; Study 3b: $b = 0.47$, 95% CI [0.30, 0.63], $t(210) = 5.63$, $p < .001$, $r = .36$, and negatively associated with perceived bias, Study 3a: $b = -0.25$, 95% CI [−0.40, −0.09], $t(219) = -3.16$, $p = .002$, $r = -.21$; Study 3b: $b = -0.23$, 95% CI [−0.35, −0.10], $t(210) = -3.54$, $p < .001$, $r = -.24$. These patterns resulted in a significant positive indirect effect through perceived expertise, Study 3a: $b = 0.11$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.21]; Study 3b: $b = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.20], and a negative indirect effect through perceived bias, Study 3a: $b = -0.11$, 95% CI [−0.21, −0.04]; Study 3b: $b = -0.12$, 95% CI [−0.20, −0.05]. Mirroring the results on attitudes, these effects on collective action intentions suggest that perceived advocate experience had a null effect on collective action intentions because perceived bias and perceived expertise functioned as opposing mediators.

13.2.2.3. Anticipated Advocate Effectiveness. As just reported, the advocates perceived as experienced versus inexperienced did not differ in their effectiveness at influencing their audience's (i.e., participants') attitudes or intentions to act. However, participants anticipated that the experienced advocate (woman) would be more effective, Study 3a: $b = 0.21$, 95% CI [0.06, 0.37], $t(221) = 2.66$, $p = .008$, $r = .18$; Study 3b: $b = 0.19$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.36], $t(212) = 2.18$, $p = .030$, $r = .15$ (see Tables 5a and 5b for complete models). There were significant associations between perceived effectiveness and perceived expertise, Study 3a: $b = 0.47$, 95% CI [0.35, 0.60], $t(218) = 7.31$, $p < .001$, $r = .44$; Study 3b: $b = 0.58$, 95% CI [0.45, 0.70], $t(209) = 9.25$, $p < .001$, $r = .54$, but not perceived bias, Study 3a: $b = -0.02$, 95% CI [−0.13, 0.09], $t(218) = -0.34$, $p = .736$, $r = -.02$; Study 3b: $b = 0.01$, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.10], $t(209) = 0.18$, $p = .854$, $r = .01$. This resulted in only a significant indirect effect of advocate experience through perceived expertise, Study 3a: $b = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.03, 0.19]; Study 3b: $b = 0.14$, 95% CI [0.05, 0.24]. When controlling for the potential mediators, there was not a significant direct effect of advocate experience on anticipated advocate effectiveness. Taken together, this pattern suggests that people do not anticipate or admit that perceived bias would undermine the effectiveness of an experienced advocate.

13.3. Discussion

Studies 3a and 3b replicated the opposing effects that advocate experience has on perceived bias and expertise. Neither Study 3a nor 3b found evidence that the advocate perceived as more versus less experienced differed in effectiveness at moving their audience's attitudes or collective action intentions. The mediation analyses suggest that this lack of difference occurred because perceived bias dampened the effectiveness of the experienced advocate, but perceived expertise enhanced effectiveness. These small to non-existent effects of perceived advocate experience on attitudes and collective action intentions are consistent with the mixed nature of previous studies that, when taken as a whole, present limited relative effectiveness of stigmatized versus non-

[6] Altenmüller, Lange, and Gollwitzer (2021) demonstrated that those who are more favorable to the advocate's position have more favorable reactions to the stigmatized advocate relative to the non-stigmatized advocate. We tested whether participants' pre-message attitudes would moderate the effect of advocate experience on any of the outcomes reported in these studies. Although the effects were in the same direction as those documented by Altenmuller et al., there was no significant moderation. Results are reported in the Online Supplement.



Fig. 6. Effects of perceived advocate experience and message type on perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness in Study 4.

stigmatized advocates.[7]

Nonetheless, Studies 3a and 3b revealed that people anticipated the experienced advocate to be more effective and that only perceived expertise seemed to mediate this effect, suggesting that people might not anticipate or admit that the perceived bias of the experienced advocate may undermine their persuasiveness. Study S1 reported in the Online Supplement, replicates these differing effects of advocate experience on collective action intentions and anticipated effectiveness. People's lay theories about the effects of advocates in this context then, seem to be inaccurate and could lead to stigmatized advocates, who are perceived as more experienced, being asked to take on a greater share of advocacy with limited, if any, boost to effectiveness.

14. Study 4

Thus far, the current manuscript has focused on situations prototypical of advocacy; in the final study, we examine whether these same trade-offs occur when confronting interpersonal prejudice. Interestingly, the literature on confronting prejudice has considered advocacy that confronts societal inequality under the umbrella of confronting prejudice (e.g. Schultz & Maddox, 2013). Nevertheless, confronting individual-level prejudice might seem more extreme or combative, which could amplify perceived bias of the stigmatized advocate, and thus result in a persuasive disadvantage. Thus, we adapted the paradigm from Studies 3a and 3b to either involve a confrontation of individual prejudice or not.

14.1. Method

14.1.1. Design and procedure

Two-hundred and forty-seven participants were recruited from the Ohio State University Psychology Research Pool. The study had a 2 (advocate: high versus low experience) X 2(message type: advocacy versus confrontation) between-subjects design. We conducted a sensitivity power analysis in G*Power (Faul et al., 2009) in which we specified $N = 247$ as the total sample size, the number of groups as 4, and the degrees of freedom of the test as 1. This suggested that across infinite samples, $N = 247$ would result in 80% power to detect $r = .18$. The advocacy conditions in Study 4 were nearly identical to Studies 3a and 3b except for some minor wording changes that we introduced to make the advocacy and confronting conditions more parallel. In the confrontation conditions, participants first saw someone named Bob post on social media, "Recently, California passed a law mandating that publicly traded corporations in California meet a quota for women on their boards of directors. This law is kind of ridiculous. Women should make up more board positions when they deserve them." Then the target advocate, Stephanie/Stephen, replied with the following comment, "I think this is a bit offensive. Women make important contributions too, and it's important for them to have opportunities in leadership roles. I support expanding this policy to the rest of the United States. It is important to push toward gender equality." Thus, the advocacy and confrontation conditions only differed in whether the message in support of gender quotas was unprompted or was a response to sexism. In the advocacy condition, the advocate rather than Bob explained that California had recently passed this quota law so participants were clear on what the law was in both conditions.

14.1.2. Measures

The perceived trustworthiness (2-items; $r = .68$), pre- and post-message attitude (3-items; $\alpha = .96$), and collective action intentions items (13-items; $\alpha = .96$) were identical to Study 3b. The perceived bias (2-items; $r = .86$), perceived expertise (2-items; $r = .57$), and anticipated advocate effectiveness (6-items; $\alpha = .93$) items were very similar to Study 3b except that instead of referring to gender quotas specifically, they referred to the advocate's post or gender equality generally. For example, one of the bias items was changed to "To what extent do you feel that [Stephanie/Stephen]'s post was a product of bias?" and one of the anticipated advocate effectiveness items was changed to, "To what extent do you think that [Stephanie/Stephen] is an effective advocate for gender equality?"

14.2. Results

We used OLS regression analyses to test hypotheses. Means for each advocate experience condition are presented in Fig. 6. We effects coded both the advocate experience factor (woman = 1, man = −1) and the message type factor (advocacy = 1, confronting prejudice = −1). As in the previous studies, we report key statistics in the text, and complete model output in tables.

14.2.1. Effects of perceived experience, message type, and their interaction on advocate perceptions

Paralleling previous studies, perceived advocate experience increased perceived bias, $b = 0.49$, 95% CI [0.32, 0.67], $t(243) = 5.49$, $p < .001$, $r = .33$, and expertise, $b = 0.26$, 95% CI [0.11, 0.40], $t(243) = 3.47$, $p < .001$, $r = .22$, but not trustworthiness (see Table 6 for complete model). Importantly, there were not main effects of message type, and

[7] These effects could have been moderated by participant gender. To provide the most powerful test of this possibility, we conducted an integrative data analysis across Studies 3a, 3b, and 4. In separate models, we regressed perceived bias and expertise on advocate gender, participant gender, and their interaction, along with codes for each study and study code interactions with advocate gender and participant gender. Participant gender did not significantly moderate the effect of advocate gender on perceived bias, $b = 0.02$, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.12], $t(670) = 0.32$, $p = .753$, $r = .01$, or expertise, $b = -0.05$, 95% CI [−0.14, 0.04], $t(670) = -1.12$, $p = .261$, $r = -.04$, suggesting that these effects are generalizable across men and women.

Table 6
Effects of perceived advocate experience, message type, and their interaction on perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness in Study 4 (the a-paths in the mediation model).

	Perceived bias					Perceived expertise					Perceived trustworthiness				
	b	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*
Experience	0.49	[0.32, 0.67]	5.49	< .001	.33	0.26	[0.11, 0.40]	3.47	< .001	.22	0.08	[−0.07, 0.22]	1.04	.297	.07
Message Type	0.01	[−0.16, 0.19]	0.17	.869	.01	0.02	[−0.13, 0.16]	0.26	.798	.02	−0.17	[−0.32, −0.03]	−2.37	.019	−.15
Interaction	−0.01	[−0.18, 0.17]	−0.09	.932	−.01	−0.08	[−0.22, 0.07]	−1.02	.308	−.07	0.08	[−0.06, 0.23]	1.14	.254	.07

Note. Degrees of freedom for these analyses are 243.

Table 7
Effects of perceived advocate experience, message type, and their interaction on post-message attitudes, collective action intentions, and anticipated advocate effectiveness in Study 4 (the effect of advocate experience indicates the c-path of the mediation models).

	attitudes					collective action intentions					anticipated advocate effectiveness				
	b	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*
Experience	0.10	[−0.03, 0.23]	1.49	.137	.10	0.22	[0.04, 0.40]	2.36	.019	.15	0.11	[−0.04, 0.27]	1.50	.135	.10
Message Type	0.04	[−0.09, 0.17]	0.65	.520	.04	0.07	[−0.11, 0.26]	0.78	.433	.05	0.03	[−0.12, 0.18]	0.37	.709	.02
Interaction	−0.04	[−0.17, 0.09]	−0.55	.582	−.04	−0.07	[−0.26, 0.11]	−0.80	.423	−.05	0.03	[−0.12, 0.18]	0.43	.669	.03
Pre-message attitudes	0.62	[0.55, 0.69]	17.56	< .001	.75	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Note. Degrees of freedom for these analyses are 242 for the attitude analyses (because they control for pre-message attitudes) and 243 for the collective action and anticipated effectiveness analyses.

Table 8
Effects of perceived bias, expertise, and trustworthiness on attitudes, collective action intentions, and anticipated advocate effectiveness in Study 4 (b- and c'-paths of the mediation model).

	attitudes					collective action intentions					anticipated advocate effectiveness				
	b	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*	*b*	95% CI	*t*	*p*	*r*
Experience direct effect	0.07	[−0.07, 0.20]	0.99	.323	.06	0.22	[0.05, 0.40]	2.49	.014	.16	0.04	[−0.09, 0.18]	0.66	.513	.04
Bias	−0.07	[−0.16, 0.02]	−1.54	.125	−.10	−0.25	[−0.36, −0.13]	−4.22	< .001	−.26	−0.13	[−0.22, −0.05]	−2.97	.003	−.19
Expertise	0.21	[0.09, 0.33]	3.49	< .001	.22	0.42	[0.27, 0.57]	5.46	< .001	.33	0.47	[0.35, 0.58]	8.04	< .001	.46
Trustworthiness	0.25	[0.13, 0.36]	4.22	< .001	.26	0.19	[0.04, 0.34]	2.47	.014	.16	0.21	[0.09, 0.32]	3.60	< .001	.23
Message Type direct effect	0.09	[−0.04, 0.21]	1.38	.168	.09	0.10	[−0.06, 0.26]	1.24	.215	.08	0.06	[−0.06, 0.18]	0.93	.351	.06
Interaction direct effect	−0.04	[−0.16, 0.08]	−0.60	.547	−.04	−0.06	[−0.22, 0.10]	−0.75	.453	−.05	0.05	[−0.07, 0.17]	0.80	.423	.05
Pre-message attitudes	0.53	[0.46, 0.60]	14.98	<.001	.70	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Note. Degrees of freedom for these analyses are 239 for the attitude analyses (because they control for pre-message attitudes) and 240 for the collective action and anticipated effectiveness analyses.

no interactions on perceived bias and expertise (*ps* > 0.3), suggesting that this same trade-off between perceived expertise and bias extends to confrontation situations.

14.2.2. Effects of perceived experience on attitudes, collective action intentions, and anticipated advocate effectiveness: potential mediation through advocate perceptions

14.2.2.1. Analysis Plan. We employed the same analyses as in the previous study, while additionally accounting for the message type factor and its potential interaction with source experience. Additionally, when results are inconsistent with previous data collections, we present an integrative data analysis (IDA; Curran & Hussong, 2009) with only the results of Studies 3a and 3b followed by an IDA that additionally includes Study 4 to provide insight into how this additional evidence influenced the overall amount of evidence against the null for our effects of interest. The full results of these models, as well as details about how they were conducted are available in the Online Supplement.

14.2.2.2. Attitudes. When we examined the effect of the advocate experience manipulation, the message type manipulation, and their interaction on post-message attitudes in a model adjusting for pre-message attitudes, there was no effect of the advocate experience manipulation, the message type manipulation, or an interaction (Table 7).

Given the lack of interaction, we continued to examine a main effect mediation model rather than a moderated mediation model. We controlled for the message type factor and the interaction between advocate experience and message type to statistically adjust for the experimental design and parallel the a-path and total effect analyses (Table 8). Analyses without these controls, that directly parallel the previous studies, are available in the Online Supplement and support the same conclusions. When adjusting for the potential mediators, there was no direct effect of the advocate experience manipulation. Replicating the previous studies, there was positive association between perceived expertise and post-message attitudes, $b = 0.21$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.33], $t(239) = 3.49$, $p < .001$, $r = .22$. The association between post-message attitudes and perceived bias was non-significant but directionally similar to prior studies, $b = -0.07$, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.02], $t(239) = -1.54$, $p = .125$, $r = -.10$. This resulted in a significant positive indirect effect through perceived expertise: $b = 0.05$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.11], but no significant indirect effect through perceived bias: $b = -0.03$, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.01]. This significantly replicated the previous studies showing a positive association between perceived expertise and post-message attitudes, but only directionally paralleled the negative association between perceived bias and post-message attitudes.

Given that the relation between perceived bias and post-message attitudes when controlling for the other advocate perceptions was significant in the previous two studies, readers might wonder about the overall meta-analytic (combined) evidence from the studies with similar experimental designs. The data from a combined analysis of just Studies 3a and 3b unsurprisingly supported the relation of perceived bias with post-message attitudes, $b = -0.12$, 95% CI [−0.19, −0.05] $t(429) = -3.41$, $p = .0007$, $r = -.16$. A combined analysis that also included the data from Study 4 provides evidence that is (slightly) less consistent with a true null hypothesis, $b = -0.11$, 95% CI [−0.16, −0.05] $t(674) = -3.85$, $p = .0001$, $r = -.15$. Thus, although the relation between perceived advocate bias and post-message attitudes was non-significant in Study 4 alone, taking the evidence comprehensively suggests that the opposing pathways of perceived bias and expertise on attitude change are quite robust. Further, when we compared the size of the perceived bias to post-message attitudes path in Study 4 to the size of the path in Studies 3a and 3b, there was not a significant difference in effect size, $b = -0.09$, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.01], $t(674) = -1.72$, $p = .086$, $r = .07$.

14.2.2.3. Collective Action Intentions. We next tested for effects of the manipulations on collective action intentions to examine whether perceived experience would again have a null effect on collective action intentions, and whether this would extend across advocacy and confronting situations (Table 7). When examining the effect of the advocate experience manipulation, the message type manipulation, and their interaction on collective action intentions, unexpectedly and different from the prior studies, the experienced (woman) advocate motivated more collective action intentions, $b = 0.22$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.40], $t(243) = 2.36$, $p = .019$, $r = .15$. There was no effect of the message type manipulation nor an interaction.

We next examined a mediation model to test whether perceived bias and expertise would have opposing relations with collective action intentions (Table 8). There continued to be a direct effect of the advocate experience manipulation on collective action intentions, suggesting that the advocate perception measures were not solely accounting for this unexpected effect. Replicating the previous studies, collective action intentions were positively related to perceived expertise, $b = 0.42$, 95% CI [0.27, 0.57], $t(240) = 5.46$, $p < .001$, $r = .33$, but negatively related to perceived bias, $b = -0.25$, 95% CI [−0.36, −0.13], $t(240) = -4.22$, $p < .001$, $r = -.26$. This pattern resulted in a positive indirect effect of advocate experience through perceived expertise: $b = 0.11$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.20], but a negative indirect effect through perceived bias: $b = -0.12$, 95% CI [−0.20, −0.06]. Thus, this once again supported the opposing effects of perceived bias and perceived expertise on collective action intentions.

Given that unlike the previous studies, there was an effect of the advocate experience manipulation on collective action intentions, we examined the meta-analytic consequences of this additional data. When examining the effect of advocate experience on collective action intentions in the combined data from Studies 3a and 3b, there was no support for this effect, with a non-significant tendency toward greater intentions following an inexperienced advocate (man), $b = -0.09$, 95% CI -0.25, 0.06], $t(435) = -1.16$, $p = .245$, $r = -.06$. In an analysis that additionally included Study 4, there was still little support, though the direction switched to non-significant greater intentions following exposure to an experienced advocate (woman), $b = 0.01$, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.13], $t(680) = 0.22$, $p = .830$, $r = .01$. This effect was significantly different in Study 4 compared to Studies 3a and 3b, $b = -0.31$, 95% CI [−0.56, −0.07], $t(680) = -2.49$, $p = .013$, $r = -.09$. As noted above, within Study 4, whether the advocate advocated or confronted did not moderate this effect. However, the experienced advocate only significantly increased collective action intentions in the confronting condition, $b = 0.30$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.55], $t(243) = 2.25$, $p = .026$, $r = .14$, not the advocacy condition, $b = 0.15$, 95% CI [−0.12, 0.41], $t(243) = 1.09$, $p = .276$, $r = .07$. It might be that viewing a woman (versus the man) confront sexism provides a role model that prompts people to reflect on what they could do to advance gender equality. Overall, despite the fact that the woman was more effective at inspiring collective action intentions in Study 4, the cumulative set of studies does not support this effect. We look forward to future work investigating the boundary conditions for this effect.

14.2.2.4. Anticipated Advocate Effectiveness. Finally, we examined whether people would anticipate that the experienced source would be more effective, as they did in the prior studies, and whether this would extend across confronting and advocacy scenarios (Table 7). When examining the effect of the advocate experience manipulation, the message type manipulation, and their interaction on anticipated advocate effectiveness, the effect of advocate experience was not significant, but was directionally similar to the previous studies, $b = 0.11$, 95% CI [−0.04, 0.27], $t(243) = 1.50$, $p = .135$, $r = .10$. There was no effect of the message type manipulation nor an interaction.

Next, we examined a mediation analysis to test whether perceived expertise but not perceived bias would be associated with anticipated advocate effectiveness. In the mediation analysis, anticipated advocate effectiveness was positively associated with perceived expertise $b = .047$, 95% CI [0.35, 0.58], $t(240) = 8.04$, $p < .001$, $r = .46$, replicating the prior studies (Table 8). Unexpectedly, perceived bias was negatively associated with anticipated source effectiveness in this study, $b = -0.13$, 95% CI [−0.22, −0.05], $t(240) = -2.97$, $p = .003$, $r = -.19$. This overall pattern resulted in a positive indirect effect of advocate experience through perceived expertise: 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20], and a negative indirect effect through perceived bias: −0.07, 95% CI [−0.12, −0.02]. When controlling for the potential mediators, there was no significant direct effect of advocate experience on anticipated advocate effectiveness.

Given that unlike the previous studies, we did not observe a significant effect of the advocate experience manipulation on anticipated advocate effectiveness, we examined the meta-analytic consequences of this additional data. When examining the effect of advocate experience on anticipated advocate effectiveness in the combined data from Studies 3a and 3b, there was support for this effect, $b = 0.20$, 95% CI [0.09, 0.32], $t(433) = 3.41$, $p = .0007$, $r = .16$. An analysis that additionally included Study 4 provided evidence that is (slightly) less consistent with a true null hypothesis, $b = 0.17$, 95% CI [0.08, 0.26], $t(678) = 3.68$, $p = .0002$, $r = .14$. Further, there was not evidence that the size of the relation was different in Study 4 compared to Studies 3a and 3b, $b = 0.09$, 95% CI [−0.10, 0.28], $t(678) = 0.89$, $p = .373$, $r = .03$, suggesting that although it was directionally smaller in Study 4, we likely should not be interpreting it as inconsistent with the previous data.

We also examined whether there would be meta-analytic support for perceived bias predicting anticipated advocate effectiveness because this path was not observed in the previous studies. In a combined analysis of Studies 3a and 3b, there was no support for perceived bias predicting anticipated advocate effectiveness, $b = -0.01$, 95% CI [−0.08, 0.07], $t(430) = -0.18$, $p = .858$, $r = -.01$. A model that also included the data from Study 4 was also non-significant, $b = -0.05$, 95% CI [−0.10, 0.01], $t(675) = -1.68$, $p = .094$, $r = -.06$. The relation between perceived bias and anticipated advocate effectiveness in Study 4 was significantly different from the relation in Studies 3a and 3b, $b = 0.13$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.23], $t(675) = 2.38$, $p = .018$, $r = .09$. Within Study 4, whether the advocate advocated or confronted did not significantly moderate whether perceived bias was associated with anticipated effectiveness, $b = 0.06$, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.14], $t(240) = 1.50$, $p = .135$, $r = .10$. However, perceived bias was only significantly associated with anticipated effectiveness in the confronting condition, $b = -0.20$, 95% CI [−0.32, −0.08], $t(240) = -3.18$, $p = .002$, $r = -.20$, not the advocacy condition, $b = -0.07$, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.04], $t(240) = -1.26$, $p = .209$, $r = -.08$. In sum, it seems possible that when advocates confront prejudice, perceived bias may negatively predict anticipated effectiveness, perhaps because it is more salient that others may have prejudice against these advocates, and therefore, perceive them as biased. This is, of course, beyond the scope of the present work, but we look forward to future work more directly testing this possibility.

14.3. Discussion

Study 4 generally provided support for the hypotheses tested in Studies 3a and 3b and demonstrated that these processes extend to a confronting situation. Further, our conceptual model continued to be supported when examining evidence across all the data we had available to test these hypotheses. However, there were two ways in which the results of Study 4 diverged from the other studies.

First, there were two results for which the current study demonstrated weaker, but consistent support. In Study 4, there was non-significant support for the association between perceived bias and post-message attitudes, as well as the effect of advocate experience on anticipated advocate effectiveness. Despite these descriptively weaker effects in Study 4, there was not support for the effect sizes being significantly different in Study 4 compared with Studies 3a and 3b, and

the combined analysis continued to clearly support these pathways. Thus, it seems likely that it was a matter of chance that these effects happened to be smaller in this study.

Second, there were two results that significantly differed from what we had observed in Studies 3a and 3b. First, we found that the experienced advocate significantly increased collective action intentions in Study 4, but not in Studies 3a and 3b. Across all the data, we found no support for the experienced advocate being more effective at inspiring collective action (and in Studies 3a and 3b, the effect is directionally opposite). However, Study 4 suggests that at times the experienced advocate might be more effective at inspiring collective action; furthermore, this effect was not accounted for by the advocate perceptions that we had measured, suggesting a different mechanism than is documented here. One possibility specific to stigmatized advocates, and not advocates perceived as experienced in general, is that receiving a message from a stigmatized advocate might prompt people to reflect on what they should do to advance equality (e.g. Johnson et al., 2017; Petty et al., 1999), resulting in a bigger effect on collective action intentions. This effect is particularly interesting given the dominant conclusions in the literature suggesting that the non-stigmatized advocate should be more effective, and we look forward to future research examining this further.

Additionally, in Study 4, but not Studies 3a and 3b, perceived bias was significantly negatively associated with anticipated advocate effectiveness, and this seemed to be especially strong in the confronting prejudice condition. It could be that when a woman confronts an instance of sexism, it highlights the stigmatization that women face and the negative impressions people might have of her as a member of this group, which could undermine her anticipated effectiveness. In sum, while beyond the scope of the present work, it's possible that when stigmatized group members confront specific instances of prejudice, it prompts people to seek ways to address prejudice and also makes them more aware of the barriers these advocates face.

It is also worth noting that Studies 3a and 3b were run in 2020, prior to the 2022 Dobbs versus Jackson Supreme Court Ruling – which revoked the constitutional right to abortion – whereas Study 4 was run in 2022 after this ruling. Because of this, sexism might have been more salient to participants in Study 4 than in Studies 3a and 3b. Increased salience of sexism may have both increased the extent to which people want to take action on sexism in response to a message from a woman and made them more aware of the barriers she might face to her effectiveness. This would explain both why advocate experience significantly increased collective action intentions and perceived bias was negatively associated with anticipated effectiveness (significantly in the confronting condition and directionally similar in the advocacy condition) in Study 4.

15. General discussion

In the current paper, six studies highlight trade-offs that experienced advocates encounter when they support a position consistent with their perceived experience. Experienced advocates tend to be viewed as more biased compared with less experienced advocates; however experienced advocates also tend to be viewed as more expert. Although in Studies 1a-2 we demonstrated similar trade-offs among sources who differed in perceived experience both within and outside of the social justice context, we conducted this work with the goal of informing research on the effects of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates in social justice contexts. That we showed similar trade-offs both within and outside of the social justice context suggests that stigmatized advocates are perceived as biased but expert because they are perceived as more experienced with discrimination and other issues affecting their group. Ultimately, when considering all of the evidence, because of the opposing effects of perceived bias and expertise on attitude change and collective action intentions, there was limited evidence that the stigmatized and non-stigmatized advocates were differentially effective. Interestingly, across studies, perceived bias was not reliably associated with how effective people anticipated that the advocate would be. Rather, only perceived expertise was consistently associated with anticipated advocate effectiveness, with participants sometimes erroneously anticipating that the stigmatized advocate would be more effective.

15.1. Implications

15.1.1. Conclusions about the effectiveness of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates

This work provides a comprehensive and nuanced view on questions about whether stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates are more effective advocates for social justice issues. The current work replicates and extends findings that stigmatized advocates are more likely to be dismissed as biased and that this perception is associated with reduced persuasive impact (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Eliezer & Major, 2012; Gardner & Ryan, 2020; Gervais & Hillard, 2014; Gulker et al., 2013; Rasinski & Czopp, 2010; Schultz & Maddox, 2013; Thai et al., 2021; Trump-Steele, 2019).

However, our data complicate the notion, commonly raised in reviews of the literature (Crandall et al., 2021; Crittle & Maddox, 2017; Drury & Kaiser, 2014; Selvanathan et al., 2020), that stigmatized advocates are at an overall disadvantage compared to non-stigmatized advocates. By highlighting that stigmatized advocates are also viewed as expert on issues of discrimination (Crosby & Monin, 2013; Gaither et al., 2019; Iyer & Achia, 2021; Thai et al., 2021), and that this perception is associated with increased persuasive effectiveness, the current work clarifies that because stigmatized advocates are viewed as biased but expert, they are often just as persuasive as non-stigmatized advocates. Prior work had demonstrated similar trade-offs in the context of scientists studying prejudice (Thai et al., 2021) but had left open questions about whether these effects would extend beyond scientific contents in which "facts" and "expertise" might be salient to advocacy contents in which "values" and "bias" might be more salient. The current work suggests that they do.

15.1.2. The importance of measuring both perceptions and effectiveness of advocates

By demonstrating varied effects of stigmatized advocates on attitudes, intentions to engage in collective action, anticipated advocate effectiveness, and advocate perceptions, the current work highlights the importance of measuring both perceptions of targets and downstream consequences for persuasion and social change support. Had we included only one or a subset of these measures, we could have reached entirely different conclusions about which type of advocate is at an advantage. As demonstrated in the present studies, negative effects observed on a particular perception can be countered by positive effects on another.

15.1.3. Perceived effectiveness versus actual effectiveness

Both persuasion and intergroup relations researchers have, at times, drawn conclusions about the effectiveness of an advocate by using measures of perceived effectiveness rather than changes in attitudes or behavioral intentions. The different effects on measures of attitude change and collective action intentions versus anticipated effectiveness suggest that perceptions of effectiveness might not be a very good proxy for actual effectiveness. Further, it suggests that in this context, there is a potential disconnect between which advocate people anticipate being most effective and the persuasive effects of those advocates. Anticipated persuasive advantages might be one reason people with stigmatized identities are often asked to take on a disproportionate burden of advocating for issues related to their group (see also Saguy et al., 2020). That we generally find no differences in the effectiveness of stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates suggests that over-burdening people with stigmatized identities for advocacy roles will not necessarily

enhance the efficacy of their messages. Rather, organizations might employ whoever happens to be motivated and have the temporal and emotional resources. Future work could examine whether people are aware of these tradeoffs as they themselves are deciding whether to advocate. If people know or are informed that their likely negative perception will be countered by a positive perception, they might be more willing to engage in collective action.

15.1.4. Additional support for the separability of perceived bias and untrustworthiness

This research builds on a growing literature distinguishing perceived bias from perceived untrustworthiness, the perception with which it is most commonly conflated (Wallace et al., 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). In none of these studies did advocate experience influence perceived untrustworthiness or inexpertise in the same direction as perceived bias, highlighting a situation in which people naturally infer perceived bias differently from these other perceptions. Further, on the collective action intentions outcome, perceived bias repeatedly had independent parallel effects, alongside perceived expertise and perceived trustworthiness, replicating previous work suggesting that perceived bias can independently undermine persuasion (Wallace et al., 2020a). Additionally, this work highlights the importance of separately considering perceived bias. At times, researchers have included items measuring perceived bias and untrustworthiness together in single index of "trust," "vested interest", or "credibility". If we had done so, we might have observed a null effect on such perceptions and then wondered why we had not replicated previous literature.

15.1.5. Strategies for enhancing effectiveness

Although not tested in the current work, the present findings imply that advocates perceived as experienced versus inexperienced (including stigmatized versus non-stigmatized advocates) might employ different strategies to try to enhance their effectiveness. Going beyond work showing that stigmatized group members are perceived as having a vested interest (Thai et al., 2021), we specifically identify that stigmatized advocates are likely to be perceived as more biased and more expert but not differently trustworthy. Such advocates could try to reduce their perceived bias by employing a non-refutational two-sided message – in which they acknowledge the other side without providing counter-arguments, in addition to advocating for their own side – a strategy that previous work suggests reduces perceived bias without influencing perceived expertise or trustworthiness (Wallace et al., 2023). Note that if stigmatized advocates were instead perceived as untrustworthy – a possibility that prior to the present research was unclear in the literature – employing a non-refutational two-sided message would not be sufficient to address this negative perception.

Because non-stigmatized advocates are likely to be perceived as inexpert but objective, prior research would suggest that expressing their views with certainty should increase audience engagement with the advocacy message (Karmarkar & Tormala, 2010), particularly if this certainty is expressed in a manner that follows the lead of the stigmatized group it is intended to support (Wiley & Dunne, 2019). Overall, understanding the trade-offs associated with each advocate and which specific negative perceptions are attributed to stigmatized advocates (i.e., bias, rather than untrustworthiness) and non-stigmatized advocates (i.e., inexpertise) provides valuable insight into how advocates might overcome these challenges.

15.2. Future directions

15.2.1. Understanding why the experienced advocate increased collective action intentions and perceived bias was associated with anticipated effectiveness in Study 4

Unlike in Studies 3a and 3b, in Study 4, the experienced advocate increased collective action intentions, and perceived bias was negatively associated with anticipated advocate effectiveness. There are two primary differences between Study 4 and Studies 3a and 3b. First, Study 4 included a confronting sexism condition, and second, Study 4 was run after the 2022 *Dobbs v. Jackson* United States Supreme Court ruling that revoked the right to legal abortion. Both of these inconsistent effects were not significantly moderated by the message type condition in Study 4 but were only significant within the confronting condition. If the *Dobbs* decision increased the salience of sexism in general and confronting somewhat additionally increased the salience of sexism, one possibility is that the salience of prejudice might moderate the effects documented in Studies 3a and 3b. It is well established that perceived injustice is an important and consistent precursor to taking action against discrimination and inequality (Craig et al., 2020; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Our data hint that if prejudice or injustice is highly salient, people might also be more receptive to a message from a stigmatized advocate and aware of the challenges they face. However, this question awaits further testing.

15.2.2. Measuring behavioral outcomes

In the current work, we examined attitude change and intentions to engage in collective action as primary dependent variables intended to capture the effectiveness of each advocate. Examining downstream consequences of advocate perceptions on attitude change and collective action intentions in this way takes a considerable step beyond prior work — which primarily focused on perceptions of stigmatized advocates — however, assessing behavioral outcomes would take this work even further. Although intentions and behaviors tend to be highly related ($r = .57$; Webb & Sheeran, 2006), and we view the results on intentions as informative for behavior change following an advocacy, we look forward to future studies examining whether the current findings extend to actual behavior.

15.2.3. Clarifying why perceived advocate bias did not affect anticipated advocate effectiveness

Meta-analytically, perceived bias was associated with attitude change and collective action intentions but not with anticipated advocate effectiveness. Although these findings were replicable, there is much yet to learn about why they might occur. Understanding the mechanisms underlying this effect could be an important means of ensuring that social justice organizations do not over-burden stigmatized advocates or turn non-stigmatized advocates away. It is possible that attempts on the part of participants to correct for biases against stigmatized group members might play a role (Wegener & Petty, 1997). That is, when asked to estimate how effective an advocate would be, participants might have dismissed their own feelings that the advocate was biased as prejudice on their part. Alternatively, even if they were not internally motivated to correct for their prejudices, they might have been motivated to not appear prejudiced to others, and thus discounted the role of perceived bias in their reports (Klonis et al., 2005; Plant & Devine, 1998).

A third possibility regards the characteristics that people weigh when given different tasks. It is possible that when considering which advocate people should choose, people are particularly sensitive to perceived expertise but are less sensitive to perceived bias. That the persuasion literature overlooked the role of perceived bias for decades (Wallace et al., 2020a) hints that lay people might similarly be relatively less aware of the role of perceived bias in persuasion.

15.3. Generalizability

15.3.1. Theoretically derived necessary conditions and types of advocacy

Because these effects rely on the more experienced advocate taking a position consistent with their experience, these effects should not occur if the advocate takes a stance on a position unrelated to their experience (see Study S1 in the supplement), takes an unexpected position (Eagly et al., 1978), or does not take a position at all. In the current work, we examined situations in which an advocate took a stance without

additional context (Studies 1a-2; including when a stance is framed as a problem or solution, Study 2), posted a message in support of a policy on social media (Studies 3a-4), and confronted a sexist comment on social media (Study 4). We found similar effects across these settings and theorize that these effects would extend to a variety of other contexts in which advocates communicate support for stigmatized groups, such as persuading others one-on-one, asking for donations, and testifying before Congress. Because our findings and theorizing rely on people communicating their stances, we do not necessarily predict that more private efforts at social change, like voting, would result in these effects, unless someone shared how they voted or another person were able to observe a target's voting behavior. We look forward to future work examining whether these effects extend to other advocacy contexts.

15.3.2. Situations that might influence the effectiveness of experienced versus inexperienced advocates

Although the current paper demonstrated that these effects generalize across a number of situations, there may be contexts that make advocate bias or expertise particularly salient; for example, more affective versus cognitive messages or more extreme versus moderate messages might highlight advocate bias versus expertise, respectively, tipping the scales in favor of the inexperienced versus experienced advocates. In Study 2, we also demonstrated that there were larger effects of advocate experience on perceived expertise for problem- rather than solution-focused messages; although there were still robust effects of advocate experience on perceived bias, future work could examine whether the boost to perceived expertise in problem-focused messages might result in an overall boost to the experienced source's effectiveness. In the long term, identifying when advocate experience will have negative or positive effects will be important in providing practical insight on the effectiveness of collective action.

15.3.3. Lack of moderation by participant gender

Some perspectives, such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), might have predicted that audiences would have more favorable reactions to advocates who shared their social identity. As such, in Studies 3a, 3b, and 4, we tested whether participant gender moderated the effect of advocate gender on perceived bias and expertise. As noted in footnote 7, even across over 600 participants, we found no evidence that participant gender moderated reactions to male versus female advocates, suggesting that these effects generalize across participants. It is an important question for future work to examine whether these effects might also generalize across other identities (e.g., race or sexual orientation).

15.3.4. Possible additive effects of self- and group-interest on perceived bias?

In the current work, we showed that people assume that advocates from stigmatized groups have more experience with social issues affecting their group, and that this assumed personal experience increases perceived bias. However, none of the advocates in our studies specifically stated that they were personally affected by the social issue or would benefit from changes to it. For example, would we see the same size effect on perceived bias if a woman who lived in California advocated for a policy in California (which would directly benefit her) versus in Oklahoma (which would not directly benefit her)? Prior work (Wallace et al., 2020c) found support for the notion that when people have a personal vested interest (versus not), they are viewed as more biased. Future research could explore whether having both personal and group-based interests would amplify perceived bias.

16. Conclusion

This work enhances our understanding of the processes underlying the effectiveness of advocates from different social groups. Although stigmatized advocates are viewed as biased, the present findings suggest that they are not reliably less persuasive than their non-stigmatized counterparts. This is because stigmatized advocates are also viewed as more expert than non-stigmatized advocates and this countervailing positive influence leads both stigmatized and non-stigmatized advocates to elicit equivalent amounts of attitude change and intentions to engage in collective action.

Interestingly, across studies, people generally anticipated that stigmatized advocates would be more effective, a finding not often borne out in the data and which could contribute to overburdening members of stigmatized groups (or underutilizing non-stigmatized group members). By examining a broad range of perceptions and effects on attitude change and intentions to behave in line with the advocacy, these studies provide a more complete view of these processes, which can facilitate advocate effectiveness on important social issues.

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Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

All data, analysis code, and research materials are available at https://osf.io/yn47d/?view_only=6336677a6f294d79a9eeb540ec683cac

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104519.

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