Publications

Fabrigar, L. R., Wegener, D. T., Vaughan-Johnston, T. I., Wallace, L. E., & Petty, R. E. (in press). Designing and interpreting replication studies in psychological research. In F. Kardes, P. Herr, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), The handbook of research methods in consumer psychology. New York: Routledge.

Wallace, L. E., Anthony, R., End, C. M., & Way, B. M. (2018). Does Religion Stave Off the Grave? Religious Affiliation in One’s Obituary and Longevity. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 1948550618779820.

Wegener, D.T. & Wallace, L. E. (2018). Attitudes. In T. Nelson (Ed.) Getting Grounded in Social Psychology. (pp. 105-147). New York, NY. Routledge.

Wegener, D. T., Kelly, J. R., Wallace, L. E., & Sawicki, V. (2014). Public opinions of biofuels: attitude strength and willingness to use biofuels. Biofuels, 5(3), 249-259.

Manuscripts Submitted or in Preparation

Manuscripts available upon request; Undergraduate collaborator denoted by underline

Wallace, L. E., Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. E. (under review). Opposite influences of bias and untrustworthiness: When flip-flopping is more and less surprising

Across five studies, we demonstrate that people expect biased sources to be consistent in their position taking. Conversely, they expect untrustworthy sources to be inconsistent in their position taking. When biased or trustworthy sources unexpectedly switch positions, it can increase persuasion.

Wallace, L. E., Goldfarb, M., Wakslak, C.J., Liviatan, I., & Fujita, K., (under review). Can system justification and system change create motivational conflict? A test of the dual-motive versus hydraulic model

Previous research has suggested treated system change as the opposite of defense (justification). However, across five studies, my colleagues and I have found evidence for a dual-motive model, in which people’s change and justification motivations function independently. This dual-motive model increases our understanding of system-level motivation by predicting and explaining people who are conflicted about the system (because they want both to justify and work for change), as well as people who are apathetic (those low in both system justification and change motivation).

Wallace, L. E., Patton, K. M., Luttrell, A., Sawicki, V., Fabrigar, L. R., Teeny, J. T., MacDonald, T. K., Petty, R. E., and Wegener, D. T. (under review). Ambivalence attenuates the relation between knowledge and attitude-behavior consistency

Previous work has demonstrated that when people have more knowledge about a given attitude object, their attitudes better predict their relevant behaviors. Across four studies on different topics, with a variety of attitude-relevant behavioral measures, the current paper demonstrates that ambivalence attenuates the effect of knowledge on attitude-behavior consistency such that attitudes held with relatively high knowledge and low ambivalence best predict behavioral outcomes.

Wallace, L. E., Wegener, D. T., & Petty, R. E. (in revision for resubmission). When sources honestly provide their biased opinion: Bias as a distinct perception with independent effects on credibility and persuasion

Much research has demonstrated that source credibility, conceptualized as the source being both expert and trustworthy, can influence persuasion. We propose that this traditional conceptualization of source credibility misses an important component: perceived bias. In two studies, direct manipulations empirically distinguish the concepts of bias (as motivated reasoning) and trustworthiness (as honesty). Additionally, across three studies, bias independently contributes to perceptions of credibility beyond effects of trustworthiness and expertise. In the final two studies, we demonstrate that this lack of credibility leads a biased source to be less persuasive.

Wallace, L. E. & Wegener, D. T. (in revision for resubmission). Influences of position justification on perceived bias: Carry over across persuasive messages

In seven experiments manipulating the argument quality of a message, the current work demonstrates that sources who provide strong arguments for their position are less likely to be seen as biased than those who provide weak arguments. Further, the current work suggests that perceiving a source as biased on one message can prompt them to test whether a source is biased in other domains, potentially leading to carry over of perceptions of bias from one topic to another.

Wallace, L. E., Wegener, D. T., & Simon, K. (in prep). A prototype analysis of the traditional source characteristics: Likeability, trustworthiness, expertise, and power

In the current work, we conducted a prototype analysis of the four traditional source characteristics: likeability, trustworthiness, expertise, and power. This bottom-up approach to understanding source characteristics provided insight into the ways that recipients perceive sources and allowed us to examine relations between the characteristics. A bottom-up understanding of source characteristics will allow researchers to develop manipulations that transcend time and topic and isolate their effects to the intended characteristic.

Philipp-Muller, A., Wegener, D. T., & Wallace, L. E. (in prep). Is moral conviction special?: A factor analytic perspective examining the relations among antecedents to attitudes strength

 Across three studies we conduct factor analyses to examine how moral conviction relates to other attitude strength antecedents, finding that although moral conviction is related to values basis, it is not as related to other traditional attitude strength antecedents, such as confidence, subjective ambivalence, and knowledge. Additionally, we find that moral conviction/values basis and the other attitude strength antecedents each predict advocating on behalf of one’s attitude.

Taylor, J., Wallace, L. E., & Wegener, D. T. (in prep). Antecedents and consequences of the attribute matching effect

Previous research has suggested that matching the valence of one’s choices with one’s choice frame (choosing one of two positive options or rejecting one of two negative options) can increase choice confidence. Across two studies, we demonstrate that this occurs because a mis-match (e.g. rejecting one of two positive options) increases subjective ambivalence. Further, we demonstrate that the increased confidence from attribute matching leads to increased choice-consistent behavior.